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significant that Professor Wigmore was the Chief Consultant in the
drafting of the Code and the Code contains Section 529 entitled
"Learned Treatises." Even our court has refused to treat the mortality
tables as final determination of life expectancy, but only as some evidence to which may be added the state of health, occupation, etc., of
the person whose expectancy is being determined." It would seem
then, that if the Bulletin were admissible at all, it would be limited in
effect to some indication of the depreciation rate, and considering the
caveat therein, not enough to finally determine that rate.
While there is a division of opinion on whether it is proper for an
appellate court to take judicial notice of a fact overlooked by the trial
judgeF it is universally held that new evidence may not be introduced
at that level. By introducing the Internal Revenue Bulletin of their
own motion, it is submitted that the court not only took judicial notice,
without apprising the parties, of an item not the proper subject thereof,
but in effect introduced evidence into the appeal.
JoHN F. KovAmK

LABOR LAW
Effect of Arbitration Agreements. The uncertainty created by the
1947 amendment to § 1 of the Washington Arbitration Act of 19431
was partially dispelled by the case of Greyhound Corporation v.
Amalgamated Association of Street, etc., Employees.'
The action arose under a non-statutory arbitration provision contained in a collective bargaining agreement between Greyhound and
the Union. The Union had objected to changes in the duties of certain
of the bus drivers in the employ of Greyhound and demanded that the
ensuing dispute be submitted to arbitration. Greyhound declined to
arbitrate, sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that no arbitrable
issue existed between the parties. The Union demurred to Greyhound's
2
6 In Roalsen v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., note 8 .supra at 675, 267 Pac. at 436, the
court said, "It is true that the effect of such (mortality) tables is for the trier of facts,
and true also that such triers, in determining life expectancy of any person, may take
into consideration his vocation, occupation, and condition of health, both mentally and
bodily, and may find that these considerations destroy the value of the tables as evidence; they are not inadmissible for that reason." It is notable that this is one of the
cases the court relied upon as authority for the judicial notice taken in the Heroux Case.
27 The Model Code of Evidence supports the proposition, see Rule 806; some
authorities hold to the contrary. See Line v. Line, 119 Md. 403, 86 Atl. 1032 (1926).
At any rate the assumption of a fact should not be treated as preventing opposing
counsel from attacking the assumption. See 9 WIGmORE, EvENc E § 2567 (3d ed. 1940).
'Laws 1947 c. 209 § 1; RCW 7.04.010.
244 Wn2d 808, 271 P2d 689 (1954).
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complaint on the ground that the matter was arbitrable and interposed

a motion for a stay of proceedings and an order that the matter be
submitted to arbitration. The Union's motion was "apparently based
upon provisions of the state arbitrationact."8 The trial court sustained
the Union's demurrer and dismissed Greyhound's complaint with
prejudice, but denied the Union's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed
the result, but on different grounds.
Declaring that it was the purpose of the 1947 amendment to remove
the doubts as to the enforcibility and effect of arbitration agreements
between employees and employers which were raised by the trial court
in the case of Sullivan v. Boeing Aircraft Company,4 the Supreme
Court held that arbitration agreements are now valid and enforcible.
In the words of the court, the parties:
have an option to provide by specific agreement that the procedures of
the act of 1943 shall be applicable and available to them in applying or
enforcing the provisions of arbitration clauses; or they may agree upon
arbitration procedures other than those under the act. But, irrespective
of election by agreement to use or not to use the procedures provided in
the act, arbitration clauses agreed upon by the parties and inserted in
collective bargaining contracts are not subject to the common-law rule
permitting revocation at the will of the parties. Arbitration clauses are
valid, binding and enforcible by appropriate action of the parties in our
state courts.5
The court then proceeded to affirm the lower court's denial of the
Union's motion for a stay and an order to submit to arbitration. This
action was grounded upon the finding that the motion of the Union
was based upon provisions of the arbitration act, and the court reasoned
3 44 Wn.2d 808, 811, 271 P.2d 689, 691. The court's conclusion as to this point is
probably based on the fact that in its appeal brief the Union assigns error to the dismissal of its motion by the trial court and bases its argument solely on the provisions
of the arbitration statute. RCW 7.04.030 provides: "If any action for legal or equitable
relief or other proceeding is brought by any party to a written agreement to arbitrate,
the court in which such action or proceeding is pending upon being satisfied that any
issue involved in such action or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such
agreement, shall, on motion of any party to the arbitration agreement, stay the action
or proceeding until an arbitration has been had in accordance with the agreement"
RCW 7.04.040 provides, inter alia, that the court, upon being satisfied that there is no
issue as to the validity of the arbitration agreement, or the failure to arbitrate, shall
make an order directing the parties to arbitrate.
429 Wn.2d 397, 187 P2d 312 (1947). In the Sullivan case, the trial court held a
non-statutory arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement void, but gave no
reasons for so holding. Between the time of the judgment of the trial court and the
argument in the Supreme Court, the legislature passed the 1947 amendment. The
Supreme Court reversed the trial court on another ground, and did not comment on
the validity of the arbitration clause.
544 Wn.2d 808, 812, 813, 271 P.2d 689, 692.
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that neither party could rely on the provisions of the act because the
agreement contained no language which could make available to them
the statutory remedies.
This treatment of the Union's motion raises a serious question as
to the extent to which arbitration agreements in labor contracts can
be enforced. It is now clear that without specific reference to the
statute in the agreement the remedies provided by the statute are not
available to either party. What, then, is available? While the Greyhound case holds that either party may obtain a declaratory judgment
in such a case, the broad language of the court leaves open ihe question
whether specific performance can be obtained. On the one hand there
is the fact that the only appropriate judicial action to enforce these
agreements is specific performance,. and there is the suggestion that
the language of the court indicates a willingness to grant it where the
parties have so agreed. On the other hand, equity courts have been
historically reluctant to grant specific performance of arbitration
agreements and it may be suggested that this case, despite its language,
does not change the common-law rule limiting the remedy to damages
in the event of a refusal to arbitrate.
An interesting question of procedure was raised by the lower court's
sustaining the Union's demurrer and dismissing Greyhound's complaint
with prejudice. This action was held to be improper because in a
declaratory judgment proceeding the test for sufficiency of the complaint is not whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested,
but whether he makes out a case of actual controversy within the
jurisdiction of the court. The judgment of the trial court was therefore
modified so as to constitute a declaration of rights in favor of the Union.
In declaring in favor of the Union that the matter was arbitrable, the
Supreme Court declined to adopt the Cutler-Hammer doctrine," despite the urgings of Greyhound. By way of dictum the court disapproved the practice of putting the burden on the parties of showing
in court that a dispute is bona fide as a condition to the right of either
party to submit the matter to arbitration. By way of holding, the
court said that "the language of the arbitration clause in this case is
sufficiently broad to require the submission of all disputes involving
SInt'l. Ass'n. of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App.Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S2d
317 (1947), afflrmed 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E2d 464 (1947). The Cutler-Hammer case
is responsible for the doctrine that frivolous and trivial disputes need not be submitted
to arbitration. This "doctrine" is of dubious strength even in New York and has been
only directly followed once. Courts usually cite the ruling, then avoid it.
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an interpretation or application of the collective bargaining contract
to arbitration."'
ROBERT M. WESTBERG
State Power to Regulate Labor Regulations. Plaintiff, who was wrongfully expelled
from a labor union, brought an action in the state court for reinstatement and for
damages measured by loss of wages. A judgment for the plaintiff was rendered in
Mahoney v. S.U.P., 43 Wn.2d 874, 264 P.2d 1095 (1953). On rehearing [145 Wash.
Dec. 422, 275 P.2d 440 (1954)], the court held that the Taft-Hartley Act [61 Stat.
136 et seq., 29 U.S.C. ed., § 141 et seq.] has precluded the state from granting such compensatory and injunctive relief based on unfair labor activities. The court further held,
however, that the state does have jurisdiction to order reinstatement as a means of protecting the employee's property and contract rights as a member of the union. The case
is more fully discussed in Wollett, Taft-Hartley and State Power to Regulate Labor
Relations, 30 WASH. L. Rsv. 1, 9-14 (1955).

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Zoning. During the past year, two decisions were handed down by the
Washington court, both of which reversed the trial court findings of
fact and resulting conclusions of law on problems involving local
zoning ordinances. In Coleman v. Walla Walla,1 the plaintiff owned a
large house near the Whitman College campus in a zone designated
as "Residential Single Family District" by city ordinances. The
ordinance contained the usual and necessary constitutional provision
that pre-existing nonconforming uses could be continued Plaintiff
proposed to sell the building, which she had previously used as a
rooming house, for use as a fraternity house.' On her suit for declaratory relief, the trial court sitting without a jury found the proposed
use of the building was merely a permissible continuation of a preexisting nonconforming use. This conclusion was primarily substantiated by two of the findings of fact: "V. no major alterations were
proposed or are needed to utilize the building as a fraternity house."'
"VI. no change in the use of said premises is contemplated except a
change in the denomination ....
I
On appeal by the city, the Supreme Court extensively reviewed these
and other findings of fact along with the conclusions of law which were
predicated upon them, and the majority of the court concluded the
744 Wn.2d 808, 821, 271 P.2d 689, 696.

144 Wn.2d 296, 266 P.2d 1034 (1954).
2 U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. XIV, § 1; WASH. CONST. ART. I, § 3.

3 At the time of the suit, plaintiff rented rooms to thirteen students all of whom were
members of the same fraternity.
4 44 Wn.2d at 298, 266 P.2d at 1035.
5 Ibid.

